



The term ‘social protection’ has been widely used around the world and is often 
treated as synonymous with ‘social security’, which is misleading. This chapter 
considers the numerous terms that have become part of the language of social 
protection, indicating that the image con veyed by the term is rather different from 
what is meant by it. 
Introduction 
In their fi rst year at university, all students should have a mandatory course 
in linguistic manipu lation. There is nothing new about the use and misuse of 
words, images, similes, and metaphors in shaping the way we think, act, for-
mulate hypotheses, and assess evidence. But the intensity with which modern 
communications bombard our senses has reached such a pitch that we need 
to develop skills of resistance. 
The notion of ‘social protection’ is peculiarly susceptible to the seductive-
ness of buzzwords and euphemisms. Elsewhere, I have argued that the linguis-
tic distortion of debates on the direc tion of certain policies constitutes one of 
the eight ‘crises’ of social protection (Standing 2002a, 2002b). This chapter 
now reviews the main terms that have been used by analysts, politicians, their 
well-paid advisers, ‘think tanks’, and commentators. The underlying theme 
is that the mainstream terminology has evolved as part of a strategy to adapt 
systems of social protection to the perceived pressures of globalisation and 
the process of labour re-commodifi cation. One could make a case for arguing 
that those using the key buzzwords have been contributing to a particular 
orientation, which inter alia envisages a shrinking role for the state, moving 
away from provision of a comprehensive relatively universalistic system of 
social support and from a wide range of enterprise benefi ts unrelated to the 
performance of labour. 
Before we start: an incidental observation. We should be serious. This means 
we should be prepared to treat the perpetrators of buzzwords with more wit. 
We should require social scien tists to defi ne those colourful phrases and to 
justify their use. More mockery would not go amiss. 
Several other contextual points are worth bearing in mind. It is surely true 
that ordinary language is idealised, giving the impression that words and 
phrases mean the same thing to all of us. In an age dominated by techne and 
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information technology, it is easy to overestimate the extent of consistency 
and comprehensibility of ordinary communication. This was a point made by 
Jürgen Habermas in his classic theory of communicative action. It is easy for 
those who dominate public discourse to assume that there is more potential 
for communication than is the case, to presume that there is a consensus, and 
to insist or imply that a convenient consensus does exist. Language is a social 
force. Throughout history, institutions have arisen to institutionalise specifi c 
discourses and divert knowledge from external critique. 
Social protection: the key terms 
The following will do no more than list and comment on what seem to be the 
key terms in the modern lexicon of social protection. Others would compile 
a different list. But one hopes that what follows captures the essence of the 
matter. Words in inverted commas are those that are considered separately or 
that are susceptible to several interpretations. 
1. ‘Social protection’, ‘social security’, and ‘welfare’ 
Let us start with the basics. These three terms are often used as if they were 
synonyms. They are not. Social protection is the broadest, signifying the full 
range of protective transfers, services, and institutional safeguards supposed 
to protect the population ‘at risk’ of being ‘in need’. Social security is the term 
that covers the state-based system of entitlements linked to what are often 
called contingency ‘risks’.1
The word welfare is peculiar, in that it has been used very differently in the 
USA and western Europe, although as with so many terms the hegemonic 
culture seems to be reshaping the per ception of welfare in Europe. In the USA, 
the word has a derogative connotation, and one is advised to say it with a 
slight sneer. In Europe, for several decades one could reasonably demand that 
policies should enhance our welfare. In the USA, polite talk refers to ‘bums 
on welfare’ and ‘welfare dependency’. The defi ning moment was when Bill 
Clinton gave the warming pledge in 1996 to ‘end welfare as we know it’. 
‘The welfare state’ as a term has been subject to a bewildering battering 
since Richard Titmuss fi rst coined the term. One reason was Gösta Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) typology of three worlds of welfare state, which has given 
a generation of sociologists enriching opportu nities to stay off the streets 
through boosting their CVs with outpourings on typologies, often with the 
word ‘regime’ added. It is a matter of personal judgment whether one fi nds 
the vast literature illuminating or confusing, or both.2 
What is the primary objective of the welfare state? Some believe it should 
promote ‘happi ness’, others that it should promote social justice, or income 
equality or equal life chances. Jürgen Habermas, among others, has depicted 
welfare legislation as having a normalising effect, and supporting established 
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stereotypes. While a lack of consensus on the objective has helped to erode 
the legitimacy of the welfare state, there should be little doubt that it has pro-
moted social norms of behaviour, and little doubt that social scientists have 
assisted in making it more effi cient in doing so. 
For many years in the twentieth century, welfare policies to protect individu-
als in need were seen as valuable for society as a whole. But the welfare state’s 
collective insurance functions, based on principles of social solidarity, have been 
gradually reduced by the rhetoric of individ ual rights-and-responsibilities and 
the rhetoric of user services, taxpayers’ money, and effi  ciency. Some now see 
the welfare state as primarily safeguarding the market economy while protect-
ing market-oriented individuals against contingency losses, stabilising labour-
based earnings. Many others make a name for themselves by proposing that 
‘welfare states’ must become ‘enabling states’ (oppose that!) or ‘social invest-
ment states’.3 No doubt they will have a lot of ‘social capital’ (a clever term that 
came into popularity when the supply-siders began to wish to see a role for the 
state, having spent a decade denigrating anything to do with it – see Ben Fine’s 
contribution to this volume).
With the thousands of publications devoted to the welfare state and its 
‘regimes’, one is left with the impression that it has been an instrument for 
preserving societies based on the perform ance of labour, in which it has rein-
forced social stratifi cation rather than the reverse. That may be contestable, 
but there is a fuzziness about the term that is used by the vast majority of so-
cial scientists and policy makers as if it had a single, uncontested meaning. 
2. ‘Need’ and ‘poverty’ 
One should not consider social protection without mentioning that the 
two most fundamental words of all are ambiguous and contested. Rarely are 
the words ‘poverty’ and ‘need’ defi ned in any detail when discussing social 
protection. 
Contrary to liberal tradition, which sees pursuit of individual interests as 
legitimate, discur sive theory maintains that needs must be determined and 
adjudicated rationally and socially. Wants and needs become negotiable by 
public standards, transforming ‘economic man’ into social citizen. This in-
volves deliberative justice, which can only be developed in conditions of basic 
security.
As various analysts have recognised, we require a politics of need interpre-
tation, which could be constructed in three stages, according to Nancy Fraser 
(1989): 
• a struggle to validate a need as a politically legitimate one, or to have it 
defi ned as a non-political matter;
• a discourse on what is needed to satisfy the need; 
• a struggle to have the need alleviated: a resource struggle. 
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Neither rights nor needs exist as objective facts that are determined scientifi -
cally, outside society. They are social constructs, determined by a process of 
consciousness. They are always relative and subject to refi nements of defi ni-
tion. In practice, social-protection systems evolve, and in doing so modify 
what is covered by the notion of need. 
3. ‘Social insurance’
This term has been used to justify social security and social protection for 
more than a century. Often one hears Eurocrats (a buzzword in itself) extol 
‘the European social model’, and state with disarming candour that it will 
be ‘defended’. The image that those who use the term are trying to project is 
social insurance, implying a model by which ‘contributions’ are matched by 
‘entitlements’, and by which the more fortunate not only cover their risks in 
case of need but also express ‘social solidarity’ by contributing to the transfers 
to less fortunate neighbours, who have also contributed in their time. It is a 
comforting model, easily understood. 
Unfortunately, it is a model of privilege, one at best suited to an economy 
in which almost everybody is in full-time, well-paid, stable jobs and in which 
contributions can be levied equi tably and effi ciently. It apparently thrived in 
a ‘golden age’ that never existed, even though that age is located in the minds 
of some social scientists in the late 1960s. 
In the twenty-fi rst century, this is even more a fi ction than when the pros-
elytisers of social insurance succeeded in selling the labourist model in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. Now, if a person has casual labour, 
or is unemployed, he or she is unlikely to have con tributions paid or be able 
to make them. If a person is working hard in caring for his or her chil dren or 
elderly frail relatives, ditto. Enormous numbers of European workers – and 
even more of the migrants in their midst – do not qualify for the range of 
social-insurance benefi ts that defi ne the European social model that is being 
defended so stoutly. And the number is growing. 
Recognising such realities, astute policy makers keen to increase ‘coverage’ 
(see [6] below) introduced ‘fi ctitious contribution periods’ to bolster the edi-
fi ce of social insurance. For example, during a period designated as legitimate 
unemployment, or maternity leave, or sick leave, a person may be classifi ed 
as having made social-insurance contributions, even though they have not 
done so, or the fi ctitious contribution may be deducted from the amount 
of trans fer, as it were. This opens up a pseudo-world of unreality: fi ctitious 
contributions from fi ctitious work, and contributions without contributing. 
Policy makers could preach the virtues of social insurance, when in fact a 
rising proportion of benefi ciaries were fi ctitious contributors, leaving govern-
ments having to top up social-insurance funds from general taxation. This has 
led to pressure to cut benefi ts and to make them harder to obtain or to retain, 
so as to balance the funds. 
 SOCIAL PROTECTION 57
4. ‘Social safety net’
This is a candidate for the title of Most Obfuscating Euphemism of the 1990s. 
With the ascen dancy of supply-side economics, it was noticed that the roll-
back of public social spending meant that a lot more people were becoming 
economically insecure, ‘vulnerable’, and ‘impoverished’. Supply-side econom-
ic orthodoxy had argued that cutting social spending and removing ‘rigid ities’ 
that were forms of protection would boost economic growth. Adding to the 
colourful imagery, it was said with fervour that ‘a rising tide would lift all 
ships’. Imagine! When this metaphor ran into the sand (sic), due to the evi-
dence of rising inequalities and insecurities, a new metaphor had to be added 
to the lexicon. So, economists, particularly in the World Bank, IMF, and OECD, 
urged governments to develop a ‘social safety net’ for the ‘really poor’. 
It has such a nice image – catching all those unfortunate enough to fall from 
the mainstream of society into ‘need’ or ‘poverty’, a net under the high-wire 
risk society, enabling them to avoid pain and to bounce back. Unfortunately, 
in reality the term has been a euphemism for ‘selec tive’, ‘targeted’ measures, 
usually ‘means-tested’, supposedly intended for those deemed to be the ‘most 
needy’. One could argue that it has been a ruse to cut public social spending, 
and one is inclined to tell those who use the term that a feature of the net is 
that the holes are so large that many of the victims fall through it. 
Because they feel that a safety net suggests lack of active intervention, some 
sages have resorted to the image of a ‘trampoline net’, implying that what gov-
ernments should do is help those falling into need to bounce back up by one 
means or another. It is easy to stretch this image to one of condemnation. 
Those not bouncing back must be unfi t or lazy or shirking, and as such should 
be ‘retrained’ or compelled to take up an available ‘work opportunity’. 
All this amounts to a model of statistical discrimination, sifting out the 
‘undeserving’ (see [9] below). Even if there were an empirically supported ten-
dency for certain types of people to fail to take available jobs, or an adequate 
income, that would not mean that all people of that type would have those 
tendencies. The term ‘safety net’ should be avoided. 
5. ‘Targeting’, ‘selectivity’, and ‘means-testing’
Targeting is another word intended to invite automatic approval. It came into 
vogue with supply-side economics and structural adjustment programmes in 
developing countries. The image is that policy should focus on the groups 
most in need, rather than being universal or untargeted. It goes with the no-
tion of ‘selectivity’, and with the special case of ‘self-targeting’, prompting a 
rather painful image for the uninitiated. Thus, Amartya Sen, among many 
others, lauds public-works schemes as an ideal form of social protection be-
cause they involve self-targeting (Sen 1999). Only if you are really desperate 
will you queue up in the heat and dust to beg for a place in the road-digging 
gang. That is the idea. But why one should favour such a scheme is unclear. 
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The implied reasoning is surely fallacious. Those most in need of income sup-
port are likely to lack the energy to reach the queue, let alone be able to work 
well in the mid-day sun and dust. 
Targeting and selectivity have been the rationale behind the global trend 
towards ‘means testing’. Here the image is that people should receive support 
from the state only if they have insuffi cient ‘means’ to support themselves. 
The means usually means income. But what counts as income? Some policies 
have counted only earned income, others have included savings, rent, divi-
dends, etc. Some have included the imputed value of property. Some have 
included the income of others on whom the person might (or might not!) 
depend for support. 
Whatever the design, means testing produces poverty traps (see [10] be-
low), and may induce ‘relationship traps’ as well, in that it might pay a couple 
to separate, at least during the day time. A modern variant is what might 
be called the old-age care trap, whereby frail elderly people have to sell their 
last-remaining assets in order to qualify for means-tested care. This growing 
practice is unedifying, demeaning, and stigmatising. But it goes with the drift 
to means testing.4
Above all, means testing and other schemes based on selectivity criteria 
fail to satisfy any principle of social justice worthy of the name, because they 
tend not to reach those most in need of income support, a fact which research 
around the world has consistently demonstrated. This is most dramatically 
the case in developing countries. It recalls the aphorism (attributed to Richard 
Titmuss) that benefi ts that are only for the poor are invariably poor benefi ts. 
6. ‘Coverage’ 
A common assertion is that a primary objective should be to increase the 
‘coverage’ of social protection, the implicit suggestion being that more people 
should be ‘covered’ by schemes pro tecting them from contingency risks. The 
ILO has launched what it calls a ‘campaign’ to increase social-security cover-
age. It is spending a lot of money on the campaign, holding lots of costly meet-
ings in exotic places. But it is unclear what ‘extending coverage’ means. For 
example, suppose a country is operating a social-insurance system to which 
only 10 per cent of the population are making contributions. If the govern-
ment abolished it and replaced it with a wholly means-tested social-assistance 
scheme, by defi nition the whole population would be ‘covered’. Would that 
be a great achievement? 
Coverage conveys another comforting image, that of a blanket. But it 
should be attached to a specifi c type of scheme. There are many forms of 
social-protection scheme that one might wish to cut, thereby reducing ‘cover-
age’. For example, it is far from clear that one would wish to see a growth of 
coverage in the form of ‘workfare’ schemes. 
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7. ‘Social inclusion’ 
Over the past three decades, social protection has gradually become a eu-
phemism for altering the behaviour and attitudes and ‘capabilities’ of those 
perceived to be ‘marginalised’ and ‘socially excluded’. None of the words in 
inverted commas in the previous sentence was part of the lexicon of main-
stream social-security discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The imagery has mirrored the reorientation of policy. Increasingly, those 
in need are charac terised as socially and emotionally defective, in need not of 
fi nancial resources but of moral fi bre, confi dence, and ‘emotional intelligence’ 
(sic). The perception that society’s ‘losers’ are in need of help because of their 
attitudinal and behavioural failings has led to more emphasis on protection 
by ‘case work’, by ‘processing clients’, if necessary by compulsion, which is 
‘good for them’, even if they do not appreciate it. Overall, social protection 
has been shifting from the domain of economics and sociology to one of 
psychology. The paternalistic triumph is a frightening spectre of increasingly 
sophisticated social engineering, in the guise of protection. The tragedy is not 
that some people do need help, but that there are few safe guards against thera-
pising people into being ‘helpless’ victims (Furedi 2004). A new occupation 
has emerged in the lexicon of social protection: ‘people changers’. What do 
you want to be when you grow up? A human case worker. 
8. ‘Active’ versus ‘passive’ policy
Not so long ago, the language of social protection was enriched by the en-
thusiastic adoption of the view that most social and labour-market policies 
were ‘passive’ and that they should become, or be replaced by policies that 
were, ‘active’. As buzzwords go, the related term ‘Active Labour Market Policy’ 
should be a candidate for a BBA (Best Buzzword Award), although there are 
other worthy candidates. 
The distinction between passive and active social policy has been based 
on the image that whereas the former gives money or services with few or no 
conditions, active policy provides jobseekers with services that enable them to 
hold jobs with pride. Policies should ‘activate’ and be ‘pro-active’. The macho 
imagery is blatant. Who could be in favour of being ‘passive’? Being passive 
implies being inactive, lazy, feeble, and lacking in sexual energy. ‘Active’ im-
plies being energetic, strong, aroused. ‘Yes, Minister, of course we are in favour 
of active policies’. 
The active–passive distinction was derived from a rather different image 
and policy. In the Rehn-Meidner model that guided Swedish macro-economic 
policy in the post-1945 era, the term ‘active labour-market policy’ meant coun-
ter-cyclical, implying that, as unemployment rose, state spending should rise 
to absorb the unemployed in training or public works. When the recession 
receded, it was expected that such policies should be cut back. By contrast, 
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‘active’ now means ‘corrective’, enabling the poor and unemployed to be more 
‘competitive’ and ‘employable’. 
In the new idiom, active policy means inducing those at the margin of the 
labour market to be ‘socially integrated’. Advocates go further. If the marginals 
do not take up the ‘opportunity’, they must be compelled to do so, because 
in the longer term they will be happier, even if they do not appreciate that 
now.5
The imagery of the dichotomy leads the observer down a familiar path. 
What if someone does not believe that she needs to be made more ‘employ-
able’ and ‘socially integrated’? Clearly, she is ‘undeserving’ of public support. 
Are we sure? 
9. ‘Deserving’ versus ‘undeserving’ poor
The undeserving poor have been around for a very long time. All social-pro-
tection systems make moralistic judgments. Who deserves support? And who 
deserves it more or less than others? The distinction between deserving and 
undeserving poor crystallised in the nineteenth century. But by early in the 
twentieth century research had shown that the distinction was arbi trary and 
unfair, and pernicious. It was resurrected in the 1980s and 1990s, as a genera-
tion of technocrat advisers to keen young politicians realised that identifying 
the undeserving was a good way of justifying cuts in public social spending, 
at a time when more attempts were being made to explain unemployment 
as essentially ‘voluntary’, the fault of the individual rather than the state of 
aggregate demand. 
The word ‘undeserving’ implies that the person is to blame for his plight. 
The notion has been enriched in recent years through the addition of what 
should be called ‘the transgressing poor’, i.e. those who are not only unde-
serving but break the law, once denied benefi ts, simply in order to survive. 
They fall foul of ‘immoral hazards’ (see [10] below). Once caught, they may be 
incarcerated, which conveniently removes them from the poverty and unem-
ployment statistics. In some states in the USA, that may be suffi cient to result 
in their losing the right to vote. Pollsters monitor the way the undeserving 
poor are prone to vote. The politicians monitor the pollsters. 
10. ‘Moral hazards’ and ‘immoral hazards’
The widely used notion of ‘moral hazard’ is a term of sublime sophistry. It is 
another candidate for Best Buzzword Award, in that it sounds intellectual and 
scientifi c, beyond the understanding of the lay person, best left to ‘experts’, 
sorting out the men from the boys. 
A moral hazard arises from a tendency for someone to be in a situation 
where it pays to stay in it rather than move out of it into something that 
is socially better. In social-protection discourse, it is associated with two ap-
pealing terms: ‘the poverty trap’ and ‘the unemployment trap’. An irony of 
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the dominant welfare reforms since the 1980s and 1990s was that they have 
spread such traps, because there was a strong shift to means-tested social as-
sistance around the world. If you can receive a state benefi t only if you are 
‘poor’, why try to move out of poverty if you would lose more in withdrawn 
benefi ts than you would gain from doing a low-paid job? The inter national 
drift to means testing led to many more people facing effective marginal tax 
rates in excess of 100 per cent, and many others facing rates not much below 
100 per cent. 
Once policy makers realised this, they tried to combine incentives with 
coercion to push people through the poverty-trap zone, making it harder to 
continue to receive out-of-job benefi ts, and often providing so-called ‘in-work 
benefi ts’, i.e. earned-income tax credits or mar ginal employment subsidies de-
signed to top up the incomes of those entering low-wage jobs. 
These words suffer from awkward drawbacks. But they convey a picture of 
millions of people trapped in moral hazards, manipulating the system while 
lying in bed and becoming obese, living a life of idleness and debauchery. 
Remarkably, moral hazards breed ‘immoral hazards’. Some people actually 
cheat. Instead of taking low-paid jobs legally or staying idle, they take jobs 
without declaring them. It should not be surprising if systems that are inten-
tionally manipulative lead to manipulative responses. But of course it takes 
only a few newspaper stories to fan middle-class indignation to the point of 
demands for benefi t cuts and acceptance of more policing of recipients of such 
benefi ts, intensifying the stigma, leading to lower take-up of benefi ts by those 
desperate for help, and encouraging identifi cation of ‘welfare cheats’, who 
are criminalised. The fi nal irony here is that this leads not only to a further 
erosion of public support for universal social protection but also to a process 
whereby a growing number of people are ‘disqualifi ed’ from receiving any 
state benefi ts. Dear reader, you will murmur that I exaggerate. Really?
11. ‘The reciprocity principle’ 
This high-sounding notion is how modernist policy advisers describe the 
claim that ‘there are no rights without responsibilities’. This is linked to the 
rhetorical question, ‘Why should taxpayers be expected to pay for benefi cia-
ries of state transfers if the latter give nothing back to society?’ Implicit is the 
double claim that their plight is their fault and that they must take a job, and 
be grateful. 
This is disingenuous. A right is a right, and should not be made conditional 
on some type of behaviour that some bureaucrat determines is appropriate.6 
If there are forms of behaviour that policy makers believe are socially inap-
propriate, they should be ruled out for all citizens equally. Should the idle rich 
be entitled to the right to eat extravagantly, when they give so little to soci-
ety? Forcing the victims of economic mishap to behave in certain ways when 
others more fortunate are not forced to do so is to treat them as second-class 
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citizens. Such ques tions soon expose the ‘reciprocity principle’ for what it is: 
a bogus argument for inequality. 
12. ‘Dependency’ 
This word came to exert a powerful hold on the minds of policy makers in the 
1990s. The claim was that vast numbers of people receiving income transfers 
were guilty of relying on them, becoming demotivated and indolent. Depen-
dency goes with ‘addiction’. The pejorative word was used to justify cuts in 
benefi ts and make them more conditional (as in ‘active’), tightening eligibili-
ty, restricting the length of time that a person could receive them, and so on. 
Dependency may be juxtaposed with ‘independence’. Again, who could 
possibly favour the former, a supine condition? Well, this simplistic imagery 
could be challenged by the claim that most of us are dependent on others 
in many ways. Biologically, the human species has survived through mutual 
dependency and collaboration. Recognition of our dependencies is a healthy 
response to our humanity. The assurance of some state transfer may provide 
just the degree of economic security to enable us to gain the confi dence to 
make rational, ‘socially responsible’ decisions. Taking it away in the guise of 
reducing ‘dependency’ may be just what is required to lead to anomic, irre-
sponsible, and ultimately self-destructive behaviour. 
13. ‘Workfare’ 
Social protection was supposed to be about ‘welfare’. But as means-testing 
and social-assist ance schemes were failing, a new word came into fashion: 
‘workfare’. What politicians and sup porters have tried to convey when 
using the word is simply that they are in favour of easing the unemployed 
into jobs instead of ‘passive’ unemployment benefi ts. But in reality workfare 
means making the taking of a job or training place the formal condition for 
obtaining a state transfer. It goes with the ‘reciprocity principle’ and ‘active’ 
labour-market policy. 
As argued elsewhere, workfare schemes have many disadvantages (Standing 
2002b: 173-95). Unfortunately, many Ministers of Labour or Social Affairs, in 
developing countries as well as in industrialised countries, have been drawn 
into using the language of workfare, without appreciating all the failings of 
what is actually involved. Among the latest to be con verted is the government 
of India, where elderly women who were entitled to a widow’s pension have 
been told that they cannot have it any more, and must take a job as a child-
carer, thereby enabling younger women to take a job in a public-works scheme 
launched as part of the so-called Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The 
disruptive consequences and the distributive effects of this set of workfare rules 
will eventually be the subject of a host of PhD dissertations. 
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14. ‘Social protection as a productive factor’ 
Social democrats met market liberals in the late 1990s in the report-strewn ter-
rain of European Union meetings, by linking social protection to production 
in this clever phrase.7 Those wishing to ‘defend’ social protection realised that 
public social spending was being depicted as a ‘drag’ on economic growth, 
productivity, and ‘development’, by ‘crowding out’ private investment, low-
ering savings, and threatening national ‘competitiveness’. Clearly, this was 
‘unsustainable’. 
It would be churlish to suggest that none of this was proven. The trick was 
to disarm the supply-side critics. So, the adopted ruse was to shift the imag-
ery, by presenting social protection as ‘a productive factor’, like ‘capital’ and 
‘labour’. 
Of course, the ruse was also an attempt to shift the composition of public 
social spending from universal, relatively unconditional transfers and services, 
deemed to be deplorably ‘unpro ductive’, to certain selective measures deemed 
to be ‘productive’. This is another route to ‘activation’ policies, and to ‘targeting’ 
and ‘selectivity’. It is a term that can justify a re orientation and a re-prioritising 
of social spending. It means that ‘workfare’ is better than ‘welfare’. Who could 
be against making social protection a productive factor? Imagine the shame: he 
wants to make it unproductive!
A minor drawback of the dichotomy is that it could lead to a focus on what 
is easy to measure in conventional economic terms. There are other drawbacks 
as well. For instance, if you justify social spending as conducive to effi ciency 
and labour productivity, then you risk being unable to justify spending that is 
not ‘productive’. An alternative view, with a long pedigree of respect ability, is 
that social protection should be about giving human beings a sense of social, 
cultural, and economic security, as a human right. That was what inspired the 
United Nations Declara tion of Human Rights in 1948, the Covenant of Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights of 1966, and the Charter of Emerging Human 
Rights of 2004. 
15. ‘Privatisation’ and ‘public–private partnerships’ 
The words ‘privatisation’ and ‘social protection’ have come together with in-
creasing ease. In the early 1990s, in developing countries and in the newly 
defi ned ‘transition countries’, the main reform promoted by the international 
fi nancial institutions was the privatisation of pen sions, with dreams of pri-
vatising health care and other aspects of social protection soon afterwards. 
Millions of dollars were devoted to the promotion of pension privatisation. 
The ‘Chilean model’ became a symbol, and numerous special trips, often 
fi nanced by the World Bank and other fi nancial agencies, were arranged so that 
budding politicians in other parts of the world could go on pilgrimage there. 
The zeal was dimmed by subsequent evidence showing the failings of the 
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scheme, particularly its lack of equity as the privatised ‘individual accounts’ 
came into effect. 
With privatisation came ‘liberalisation’ and ‘commercialisation’. And qui-
etly there emerged ‘private–public partnerships’, or as, inevitably they became 
known, ‘PPPs’. This is related to the new preference for ‘welfare pluralism’, 
and is a euphemism for a trend towards private fi nancing and provision.8 Of 
course, the word ‘partnership’ is not exactly neutral. Is it a partnership of 
equals, with each gaining as much, and paying as much? Who is really in 
control? Consider the claim, ‘We must have more PPPs, partnerships!’ Unless it is 
defi ned, the term is dangerously vague. But the tendency is to favour ‘partner-
ship’. It has a nice cuddly sound to it. The provision of subsidies to those dubi-
ous private ‘providers’ is downplayed. 
The acronym PPP is not a short form of a descriptive compound noun but 
an ideological concept. One may like it or not, but the objectives and mo-
tives are concealed. Probably, it is a mechanism for enabling multinationals to 
penetrate a particular social service. When a poli tician or policy adviser says 
there should be incentives for PPPs, what he or she probably means is that 
there should be subsidies for foreign capital, to ‘encourage’ foreign fi rms to 
invest in the country. It is unlikely that the politician will join the board or 
take a consultancy with the fi rm shortly afterwards. Perish the thought. That 
is possibly covered by the hyphen in the full term. But such cynicism is surely 
misplaced. 
16. ‘Social dumping’ and ‘the race to the bottom’
‘Social dumping’ is a myth, claims Professor Lord Anthony Giddens, com-
monly called the ‘high priest’ of the Third Way and long-time adviser to Tony 
Blair (Giddens 2006). This term is a source of anguish among social-protection 
specialists. It originated as analogous to the dumping of goods, sold in a for-
eign market at less than the cost of production in order to capture market 
share. But social dumping is really about the argument that we in country X 
cut social benefi ts in order to make our production more ‘competitive’ than 
those in country Y, and to retain jobs that would otherwise go to country Y. 
The image goes further with a race to the bottom, suggesting that all countries 
are cutting back on social benefi ts in order to become more competitive than 
others, lowering their ‘non-wage labour costs’. 
It is not very nice, this race. It is good to know that Lord Giddens regards 
social dumping as a myth. He believes that moving jobs to countries with low-
er social protection will result in pressure there to raise benefi ts. This is really 
a delightful example of wishful thinking. Total labour costs in western Europe 
in, say, car production are about 50 times what they are in China. It will take 
rather a long time for those benefi ts to rise to narrow the difference. 
The reality is that governments and companies are using international 
competitiveness and the desire to preserve jobs as justifi cation for benefi t cuts. 
Those are not myths. But we can be carried away by the euphemisms. To some 
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extent, benefi ts are dwindling. But quietly, gov ernments are responding by 
raising subsidies to capital, to lower the costs borne by corpor ations. One day 
that will come on to the agenda of the WTO, as a form of unfair competition 
and trade distortion. Meanwhile, the pace and extent of social dumping may 
have been lessened, but not stopped. Rather than a race to the bottom, it is 
likely that there is a trend towards convergence, to below what was the dream 
of social democrats in the mid-twentieth century. 
Concluding refl ections
Social protection has been misused. Poverty and economic insecurity are refl ec-
tions of inequal ity, of income, wealth, power, and status. A society in which 
everybody had a right to basic security would address inequality directly. But in 
the globalisation era, so far, there has been a drift to a charity perspective, not 
a rights-based one. We are all urged to contribute, altruis tically, to charities, to 
adopt a goat, fund an African child’s schooling, and so on. Pity, as Bernard Shaw 
so memorably put it, is akin to contempt.
Alongside charity, there is a slide into coercion and a slide into discretion 
as a principle of social benefi ts. Local bureaucrats are given the quiet nod to 
decide on who should receive benefi ts, who should not, and what conditions 
on which those chosen should be given the benefi t. It is all very paternalistic, 
leaving the inequalities unchallenged. 
Linguistically, we must never forget that language can be used as a means 
of resistance, even though we have focused on how policy makers and ideo-
logical proponents of particular changes manipulate language. Claimants of 
public assistance in the UK and elsewhere use the language of the elites to 
turn against them, as when they refer to using ‘enterprise’ and ‘responsibility’ 
by doing undeclared work for cash. We have not assessed the buzzwords of 
resistance in this chapter. They merit a separate treatment. 
One extraordinary feature of the topic of social protection – and it is by 
no means unique in this respect – is the proliferation of acronyms. These are 
rarely innocent. But what they tend to do is to give insiders an advantage, a 
capacity to blind outsiders with science. The PRSP must help to deliver the 
MDGs, and the IFAs will support that. 
More generally, social protection is not a fi xed concept; it is an elastic notion 
that every user of the term can defi ne differently. A statement such as ‘we must 
devote more resources to social protection’ might elicit consensus support and 
nods of agreement. But few might agree if what the speaker meant was that 
more resources should be devoted to workfare schemes, or conver sely to give 
every citizen a basic income without obligations. Now, that is a good idea.
Notes 
1. Social protection is supposed to compensate for risks, but it is not clear 
what types of risk should be included. Analysts have differentiated 
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between idiosyncratic and systemic risk, and between risks, shocks, and 
hazards. It all becomes a little confusing. But the key point is that differ-
ent systems of social protection cover different types of situation needing 
some form of social protection. 
2. This writer’s views about the vagueness of the original effort were given 
in a review of the book at the time in the Journal of European Social Policy 
(Standing 1991). 
3. On the former, see Gilbert 2002; on the latter, see Giddens 2000. 
4. As this chapter was being fi nished, the Bush Administration in the USA 
was announcing that it was extending means testing to its old-age Medic-
aid programme, ostensibly to prevent the non-poor receiv ing subsidised 
health care. A predictable result will be that many more of the near-poor 
will slip into impoverishment. 
5. This is the explicitly stated view of Blair-adviser Richard Layard (2005), 
ennobled by New Labour for his policy contributions. 
6. For a defence of this view, drawing on the idea of republican, or claim, 
rights, see Standing 2005. 
7. Not surprisingly, the ILO took up the subject several years later, by when 
the proposition had descended into confusion. 
9. For useful reviews, see Mehrotra and Delamonica 2005; Webster and 
Sansom 1999. 
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